Version: 2026-11-16 draft
How to use this pack
A Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) is the school's own document. Under GDPR Article 35 the controller, that is the school, must carry one out before processing that is likely to result in a high risk to individuals; systematic monitoring of a publicly accessible area on a large scale and processing of children's data are both markers of high risk in the guidance. The UAE PDPL contains an equivalent duty to assess processing that uses new technology and is likely to pose a high risk.
This pack gives you the facts about the system that you will need, lists the questions you should ask, and offers templates. It does not reach conclusions for you. Where this pack says "the school should assess", that is the school's judgement to make and to record, ideally with its data protection officer (DPO) or external adviser.
Reference material (official sources):
- GDPR, Regulation (EU) 2016/679, Articles 35 and 36: EUR-Lex
- Article 29 Working Party, Guidelines on Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) and determining whether processing is "likely to result in a high risk", WP248 rev.01 (13 October 2017), endorsed by the EDPB: European Commission newsroom
- EDPB, Guidelines 3/2019 on processing of personal data through video devices, version 2.0 (29 January 2020): EDPB
- UAE PDPL, Federal Decree-Law No. 45 of 2021 Regarding the Protection of Personal Data: u.ae: Data protection laws
- Your national supervisory authority's list of processing operations that require a DPIA (GDPR Article 35(4)), and any national rules on CCTV in schools. [add links for the target countries, for example Bulgaria's CPDP]
Aegis Vision will answer technical questions from the school, its DPO or its supervisory authority. Contact: privacy@aegisvision.org.
Part 1: Description of the processing
1.1 What the system is
The Aegis Vision system is software installed on a server inside the school. It connects to the school's existing CCTV cameras over the school's own network and analyses the video in real time to detect weapons (such as handguns, rifles, knives or blades, explosive devices and blunt weapons) and, where the school enables them, safety incidents (such as fights, a person who collapses and stays down, an unattended bag, or a guard post left empty). When something is detected, the system raises an alert on a console used by the school's own security staff, who look at the alert image and decide what to do.
1.2 What the system is not
- It does not perform facial recognition of pupils, staff, parents or visitors. [exact scope of the optional guard-post module, which recognises only the enrolled guard's face on the camera covering that post, and whether it will be enabled at this school]
- It does not match anyone against any database or watch-list.
- It does not build profiles, track movements over time, or record attendance.
- It does not analyse behaviour of individuals beyond the specific incident types listed above.
- It does not send video, images or alerts to the police or any outside body by itself. Any escalation to the authorities is a decision taken by a person at the school, except on the highest-severity tier if the school chooses to configure automatic calls, which is off by default. [default state of automatic emergency calling]
- It does not replace existing CCTV recording. Recording continues as before, under the school's existing policy.
1.3 Data-flow narrative
- Cameras to server. The school's cameras already stream video to the school's recorder. The Aegis Vision server on the school's network takes the same streams (RTSP). No new cameras are needed and camera coverage does not change unless the school decides to change it.
- Analysis on the server. Each frame is analysed on the server in the school. A fast detector looks for the configured object and incident types; a larger model verifies any candidate detection; classifier models then grade the incident. Frames that contain no detection are discarded immediately and are not stored by the system.
- Alert to the guard console. When a detection is confirmed, the system stores a short clip and still images of the detection on the school's server and shows an alert on the guard console, which runs on the school's local network. A member of school security staff confirms, dismisses or escalates the alert. The decision is recorded in the alert log.
- Notification. If the school configures it, the system can send an SMS or voice call to designated phones through a GSM modem at the school. It does not use consumer messaging apps.
- Storage and retention. Alert clips, stills and the alert log stay on the school's server, protected by the access controls the school sets. They are deleted after the retention period the school sets. [default retention period and whether it is configurable by the school]
- Nothing leaves the school by default. Full-resolution video, alert clips and unredacted images stay on the school's server.
- Support access, on request. If the school asks Aegis Vision for support, the school can grant temporary remote access over an encrypted private connection. This access is logged. During support Aegis Vision staff may see what the school shows them.
- Optional "Send to Hub". A school administrator may choose to send selected detection crops to Aegis Vision to improve the detection models. Before transfer, each crop is cut down to the region around the detected object or event, faces are blacked out, and file metadata is removed. Aegis Vision uses these crops to train models and does not attempt to identify anyone. The school can decline to use this function at all.
- Updates. Software and model updates come from Aegis Vision to the school's server through the agreed maintenance process; they do not involve any transfer of school data to Aegis Vision.
A diagram of this flow is available from Aegis Vision on request. [diagram prepared]
1.4 Data inventory
| Data item | Source | Where stored | Who can see it | Retention |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Live video frames in analysis | Cameras | Server memory only; not written to disk unless a detection occurs | No one; machine processing only | Seconds |
| Alert stills and clips | Server | School's server | School security staff with console accounts; school administrators | [retention set by school] |
| Alert log (time, camera, detection type, confidence, guard decision, user who decided) | Server | School's server | As above; school DPO on request | [retention set by school] |
| Console user accounts | School | School's server | School administrators | Life of the account |
| Training crops (optional) | School administrator's choice | Aegis Vision | Aegis Vision engineering staff | [retention] or until the school asks for deletion |
| Support session logs | Server and Aegis Vision | Both | School administrators; Aegis Vision support staff | [retention] |
1.5 Data subjects
Pupils and students (including children under 13 and, depending on the school, under 18), staff, parents and carers, visitors, contractors, and anyone in view of a connected camera. The school should identify which cameras are in scope and whether any cover spaces where people have a heightened expectation of privacy; the EDPB video guidelines discuss such spaces.
1.6 Roles
The school is the controller. Aegis Vision is a processor for support, updates and training crops only, under the Data Processing Agreement. The school's existing CCTV provider or integrator may also be a processor for the cameras and recorder under its own contract.
Part 2: Necessity and proportionality (for the school to assess)
The WP248 guidelines ask the controller to record the measures envisaged to comply with the Regulation, including the lawful basis, purpose limitation, data minimisation, storage limitation, information to data subjects, and the rights of data subjects. The following questions are offered for the school to answer and record. This pack does not answer them.
Purpose. What specific safety problem is the school addressing? Is there evidence of the risk (incidents, local context, regulator guidance)? Would the system be used for anything else, for example discipline or monitoring staff? The EDPB guidelines are clear that purposes must be specified before deployment and that later "purpose creep" must be avoided.
Lawful basis. Which basis in GDPR Article 6(1) does the school rely on? Public-sector schools often look at Article 6(1)(e) (task in the public interest) with a basis in national law; private schools often look at Article 6(1)(f) (legitimate interests), which requires a documented balancing test, and consent is rarely suitable for CCTV in schools. If any special-category data could be processed, which Article 9(2) condition applies? Under the UAE PDPL, which permitted basis applies? [with the school's counsel]
Necessity. Could the same safety aim be met with less intrusive means, for example more staff, physical security measures, or detection on fewer cameras? Why is real-time AI analysis needed rather than reviewing recordings after an event?
Proportionality. Is the scope limited to what the purpose needs: which cameras, which detection modules, which hours? Are spaces such as toilets, changing rooms, medical rooms and counselling rooms excluded? Are the retention periods the shortest that serve the purpose?
Accuracy and false alarms. What are the consequences of a false alarm for a pupil (for example being confronted by staff over a harmless object) and what procedure prevents harm? Aegis Vision will supply its current measured detection and false-alarm figures and the limits of those measurements. [figures that can be shared and how they were measured] The school should note that no detection system is perfect and should plan on that basis.
Transparency. How will pupils, parents, staff and visitors be told? The EDPB guidelines describe a layered approach: signs at the point of entry with the key information, and a full notice available elsewhere. The parent notice template in this pack can be adapted.
Data subject rights. How will the school handle access requests for alert images, objections, and requests for erasure? Who is the contact?
Processor. Has the school signed the Data Processing Agreement with Aegis Vision, and reviewed the sub-processor list and the international-transfer position?
Consultation. Has the school sought the views of data subjects or their representatives (GDPR Article 35(9))? See Part 4.
Part 3: Risks to individuals and mitigations
The table lists risks the school should consider. Likelihood and severity are for the school to rate; suggested mitigations are those built into the system or available to the school. The school may identify other risks.
| # | Risk to individuals | Built-in or available mitigation | Residual risk (school to rate) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Children are watched more closely than before and feel surveilled, affecting their behaviour and wellbeing | The system watches for objects and incident types, not for people; no identification, no profiles, no tracking; same cameras as before; transparent notice to pupils in age-appropriate language; pupil consultation | |
| 2 | A child is wrongly suspected because of a false alarm (for example a ruler mistaken for a knife) | Multi-stage verification before an alarm sounds; a human reviews the image before any action; a written procedure for calm, proportionate response; false alarms logged and reviewed; retraining on the school's own confirmed alerts by a human operator | |
| 3 | Images of children leave the school and are misused | Default: nothing leaves the school; only the school administrator can trigger "Send to Hub"; crops are cut to the detection region with faces blacked out and metadata removed; DPA with deletion rights; no sale of data; no use for any purpose other than model improvement | |
| 4 | Unauthorised access to alert images on the school's server | Console runs on the local network with individual accounts; role-based access; access logging; school controls account issue and removal; server physically secured by the school | |
| 5 | Images kept longer than necessary | School sets retention; automatic deletion after the period [automatic deletion exists]; existing CCTV retention policy applies to recordings | |
| 6 | Function creep: later use of the system for discipline, attendance or staff monitoring | Purposes fixed in the DPIA and notice; the system has no such features; any new module requires a DPIA update and new notice | |
| 7 | Discrimination or uneven accuracy across groups | Detection is of objects and body movement, not faces or identity; the school should still ask Aegis Vision how models were tested and monitor false alarms by location and context [available evaluation evidence] | |
| 8 | Over-reliance on the system, so that other safeguarding measures weaken | The system is an aid to staff, not a replacement; the school's safeguarding policy continues to apply; alerts always go to a person | |
| 9 | Emergency services called on a false alarm | Automatic calling is off unless the school enables it for the highest-severity tier; a person confirms alerts first | |
| 10 | Special-category data revealed incidentally (religious dress, disability, health) | Not processed for that purpose; no inference features; access limited to need-to-know staff | |
| 11 | Security vulnerability in the software | Vulnerability disclosure policy; update process; no public exposure of the console; encrypted private network for support | |
| 12 | Data transferred outside the EU or UAE | Processing on site; Aegis Vision is in the UAE; Standard Contractual Clauses for EU schools; UAE PDPL transfer conditions for UAE schools; see DPA clause 13 |
Part 4: Consultation
GDPR Article 35(9) asks the controller, where appropriate, to seek the views of data subjects or their representatives. The school should consider:
- Parents and carers: a letter or meeting explaining the system before deployment, using the parent notice template; a channel for questions and objections; a record of what was raised and how the school responded.
- Pupils and students: age-appropriate explanation, for example through the student council; an opportunity to ask questions.
- Staff and unions: staff are also in view of the cameras; explain that the system does not monitor staff performance.
- DPO or adviser: the DPO's advice must be sought and recorded (GDPR Article 35(2)).
- Security staff: those who will use the console should be consulted on the response procedure.
- Supervisory authority: if the school concludes that a high residual risk remains that it cannot mitigate, GDPR Article 36 requires prior consultation with the supervisory authority before processing starts.
Record who was consulted, when, what they said, and what changed as a result.
Part 5: Residual-risk table (template)
| Risk # | Likelihood (remote / possible / probable) | Severity (minimal / significant / severe) | Mitigations adopted | Residual risk (low / medium / high) | Accepted by | Date |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | ||||||
| 2 | ||||||
| 3 | ||||||
| ... |
If any residual risk is rated high, the school should not start processing without prior consultation under GDPR Article 36.
Part 6: Sign-off block (template)
| Item | Name | Role | Date | Signature |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Measures approved by | [Head teacher / Principal] | |||
| Residual risks accepted by | [Head teacher / Principal or governing body] | |||
| DPO advice provided | [DPO] | |||
| DPO advice accepted or overruled, with reasons | ||||
| Summary of consultation responses and actions | ||||
| Supervisory authority consulted (if required) | ||||
| Review date |
Review. The DPIA should be reviewed at least annually, when a new detection module is enabled, when camera coverage changes, when the retention period changes, or after any incident involving the system.
Annex: Information Aegis Vision provides on request
- Architecture and data-flow description (this pack, Part 1)
- Data Processing Agreement with security measures (Annex B) and sub-processor list (Annex C)
- Current detection and false-alarm measurements and how they were obtained []
- Description of model training data sources and licences [what can be disclosed]
- Vulnerability disclosure policy and update process
- Answers to supervisory-authority questions through the school